The coal-electricity linkage policy was promulgated at the end of 2004, and it is a transitional policy formulated to solve the coal-power and coal-power conflict. From May 2005 to November 2009, the country implemented five coal-fired linkages. However, the increase in the price of electricity is much lower than the increase in the price of coal, which is far from making up for the increase in the cost of thermal power companies caused by the rise in coal prices.
Judging from the implementation situation, due to factors such as the control of rising CPIs and macroeconomic control, the government gradually failed to make timely linkages and the extent of linkages was not in place during the implementation process. It was basically impossible to implement them in the later period, causing thermal power companies to face coal alone. The price rise caused by operating difficulties.
There is a misunderstanding of coal-electricity linkage. One of the basic ideas of the coal-electricity linkage policy is to increase the price of electricity by the end, so that the average consumer will bear some of the rising costs of electric coal. However, the author believes that the coal-electricity linkage policy has obvious misunderstandings on this point, and this has also led to the incomplete implementation of coal-fired linkage policies.
Firstly, according to related claims, one of the reasons for the increase in electricity price is that the energy price level in China is low for a long time. It should be gradually linked with the prices of international energy products and the external costs of energy resources should be reflected in the prices. Although China’s energy resource prices were low and not in line with international standards, the average income level of the people at that time was also at a correspondingly low level. If it was to be linked, it should also be a “coal-electricity-and-electricity linkageâ€, that is, ultimately paying for the rise of resource prices. People’s income (including retirement wages) should also be linked. Second, coal and Other mineral resources are resources owned by the entire people. In recent years, coal prices have soared, and coal companies’ profits have skyrocketed. These profits are not basically created by enterprises through improving their efficiency, but the scarcity of natural resources has caused prices to rise sharply, that is, the value-added of resources. The value-added part of resources should be the entire people. Shared rather than corporate unique.
The reality is that the vast majority of people have not only enjoyed the fruits of resource appreciation, but have instead paid for the rise in electricity prices caused by rising coal prices. This is totally unreasonable. Combined with the background of excess liquidity that China has faced for a long period of time, the original intention of the coal-electricity linkage policy is to allow the market to play a fundamental role in the allocation of resources. In fact, it has turned into a society-wide impact on resource prices, which is bound to rise on the CPI. It's understandable to be able to help, and it can't be implemented.
The coal-fired power generation market has particular characteristics. After the implementation of coal-power electricity linkage, why coal prices have been rising sharply and have risen unilaterally? There are many reasons for this. Now the author mainly makes a brief analysis of the price elasticity of supply coal and the elasticity of supply price.
The purpose of promoting reform of state-owned enterprises during reform and opening up is to allow enterprises to become the main body of legal persons who manage their own businesses and assume responsibility for their own profits and losses. However, the current thermal power companies' characteristics as the main players in the production and management of the market economy are not obvious, because they cannot determine how much production or production depends on the price and supply of raw materials, the selling price of products, and their own financial status, but rather passively make the economy. Decisions have been made on behalf of people as a result of impairment of state-owned assets. According to the directives of the government and the power dispatching department, no matter whether the coal price is high or low, electricity must be generated. Therefore, the demand for electric coal is certain and increases with the increase of electricity consumption in the entire society. The price elasticity coefficient of electric coal demand is very small. That is, lack of flexibility.
To promote the market-oriented reform of a certain type of products, we must use a value law. This kind of resource product of coal has significant differences from ordinary commodities. Ordinary commodities such as fruits and vegetables, the price of production is reduced by more, because if prices are not sold, only rotten ones are lost. If there is less production, more people will need to raise prices. This is the change of supply and demand relationship to determine the equilibrium price. The difference in power coal is that prices only increase continuously to maintain the original supply, otherwise the supply will be reduced because coal is scarce and there is no substitute for thermal power plants and buried in underground quality over time. It will not get worse, and if this resource is not mined, it still belongs to the coal company, but it is deferred to realize its value fulfillment. Coal companies have a consistent expectation of a long-term increase in coal prices. A moderate increase in prices will not provide a strong stimulus for coal companies to increase the supply of coal. Therefore, the price elasticity of coal supply is also very small, that is, lack of flexibility.
In the event of market failure in adjusting the supply and demand of coal, it depends on government regulation. As managers, including price management departments, economic operations management departments, and state-owned enterprise assessment departments, while allowing thermal power companies to generate electricity without taking into account losses, they issued a major contract to implement double-regulation coal prices, while focusing on assessment based on profit indicators, which led to regulation. The direction did not form a consensus, and eventually formed a non-market unplanned embarrassing situation.
The contradiction between coal and electricity is a manifestation of deep-seated contradictions. The huge losses of thermal power companies and the huge profits of coal companies are determined by the current situation of China's resource allocation system. Most of the backbone thermal power enterprises in the province are mainly affiliated with the five major power generation companies and other central enterprises. Coal companies, except for a few central enterprises such as Shenhua and China Coal, are all basically local enterprises. Coal and chemical fertilizer thinning are the result of the game of deep interests of the central government.
This has a history of evolution. Before liberation, China already had small coal mining and small hydropower construction. Therefore, after the liberation, it basically continued the allocation of resources for local Shangguan small coal mines and small hydropower. In 1998, the state dissolved the coal department and subordinated to the state-owned key coal enterprises (except Shenhua). In addition to six large companies such as group companies, all local management is devolved, so coal is basically a local management.
Now that oil, natural gas, large hydropower, nuclear energy, etc., which are in absolute proportion in China’s energy industry, were all put into place by the central government after the liberation of manpower and material resources, this part of the allocation of natural resources naturally belongs to the central government.
Although the provinces currently have the financial strength to develop these projects, they do not have the corresponding resource allocation rights and income rights. The provinces have made quite a few remarks on the central government’s take away of local oil, gas, and large hydropower, leaving only a small amount of tax revenue for local governments. Some provinces have even issued compensation measures for the collection of compensation for natural resource development. They were later stopped by the state. In fact, it reflects that local governments are dissatisfied with the country's control over the allocation of resources and the right to receive revenues in local areas.
The coal-electricity contradiction in our country has been a long time ago, but why hasn't the government made relevant policy adjustments?
(a) The relevant government departments have historically re-emphasized the fairness of primary energy sources and energy sources, light secondary energy sources and various energy sources. Their attention is mainly focused on whether China’s overall energy supply can meet the needs of national economic development. In the current situation where petrochemical energy needs to be imported in large quantities, the contradiction between coal and electricity is a secondary contradiction in China's energy development.
(b) Although the State has set up an energy board to deal specifically with the country’s energy work, the energy management functions are actually scattered among the more than a dozen ministries (bureaus) such as the relevant departments of the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Construction. Horizontal coordination is difficult.
(3) The most difficult problem is that the contradiction between coal and electricity involves the contradiction between the central government and local governments. Only the higher level of the government can solve the problem.
The reform of resource income was divided into the reform of China's electric power system. Since the follow-up reform measures did not keep up, it became a pot of rice. The author believes that the real solution is to govern at the source, readjust the allocation and income rights of resources from the national level, and establish the awareness of all citizens in resource ownership.
The central government exercises the right of allocation and income on behalf of the people and entrusts the provincial government to manage them on a scale basis. It establishes a sound income sharing system and radically changes the original simple taxation system in place of the resource income distribution system. The resource-based enterprises will basically implement the approved cost plus reasonable profit method, and the resource-reducing revenue countries will take the bulk, and the local governments at all levels will share the proportion.
With the rapid development of China's economy and society, according to China's actual situation, we must, on the basis of ensuring energy supply, reflect fairness and reasonableness, appropriately allocate resources according to the requirements of marketization, and establish a coal power system mechanism that conforms to China's national conditions.
Judging from the implementation situation, due to factors such as the control of rising CPIs and macroeconomic control, the government gradually failed to make timely linkages and the extent of linkages was not in place during the implementation process. It was basically impossible to implement them in the later period, causing thermal power companies to face coal alone. The price rise caused by operating difficulties.
There is a misunderstanding of coal-electricity linkage. One of the basic ideas of the coal-electricity linkage policy is to increase the price of electricity by the end, so that the average consumer will bear some of the rising costs of electric coal. However, the author believes that the coal-electricity linkage policy has obvious misunderstandings on this point, and this has also led to the incomplete implementation of coal-fired linkage policies.
Firstly, according to related claims, one of the reasons for the increase in electricity price is that the energy price level in China is low for a long time. It should be gradually linked with the prices of international energy products and the external costs of energy resources should be reflected in the prices. Although China’s energy resource prices were low and not in line with international standards, the average income level of the people at that time was also at a correspondingly low level. If it was to be linked, it should also be a “coal-electricity-and-electricity linkageâ€, that is, ultimately paying for the rise of resource prices. People’s income (including retirement wages) should also be linked. Second, coal and Other mineral resources are resources owned by the entire people. In recent years, coal prices have soared, and coal companies’ profits have skyrocketed. These profits are not basically created by enterprises through improving their efficiency, but the scarcity of natural resources has caused prices to rise sharply, that is, the value-added of resources. The value-added part of resources should be the entire people. Shared rather than corporate unique.
The reality is that the vast majority of people have not only enjoyed the fruits of resource appreciation, but have instead paid for the rise in electricity prices caused by rising coal prices. This is totally unreasonable. Combined with the background of excess liquidity that China has faced for a long period of time, the original intention of the coal-electricity linkage policy is to allow the market to play a fundamental role in the allocation of resources. In fact, it has turned into a society-wide impact on resource prices, which is bound to rise on the CPI. It's understandable to be able to help, and it can't be implemented.
The coal-fired power generation market has particular characteristics. After the implementation of coal-power electricity linkage, why coal prices have been rising sharply and have risen unilaterally? There are many reasons for this. Now the author mainly makes a brief analysis of the price elasticity of supply coal and the elasticity of supply price.
The purpose of promoting reform of state-owned enterprises during reform and opening up is to allow enterprises to become the main body of legal persons who manage their own businesses and assume responsibility for their own profits and losses. However, the current thermal power companies' characteristics as the main players in the production and management of the market economy are not obvious, because they cannot determine how much production or production depends on the price and supply of raw materials, the selling price of products, and their own financial status, but rather passively make the economy. Decisions have been made on behalf of people as a result of impairment of state-owned assets. According to the directives of the government and the power dispatching department, no matter whether the coal price is high or low, electricity must be generated. Therefore, the demand for electric coal is certain and increases with the increase of electricity consumption in the entire society. The price elasticity coefficient of electric coal demand is very small. That is, lack of flexibility.
To promote the market-oriented reform of a certain type of products, we must use a value law. This kind of resource product of coal has significant differences from ordinary commodities. Ordinary commodities such as fruits and vegetables, the price of production is reduced by more, because if prices are not sold, only rotten ones are lost. If there is less production, more people will need to raise prices. This is the change of supply and demand relationship to determine the equilibrium price. The difference in power coal is that prices only increase continuously to maintain the original supply, otherwise the supply will be reduced because coal is scarce and there is no substitute for thermal power plants and buried in underground quality over time. It will not get worse, and if this resource is not mined, it still belongs to the coal company, but it is deferred to realize its value fulfillment. Coal companies have a consistent expectation of a long-term increase in coal prices. A moderate increase in prices will not provide a strong stimulus for coal companies to increase the supply of coal. Therefore, the price elasticity of coal supply is also very small, that is, lack of flexibility.
In the event of market failure in adjusting the supply and demand of coal, it depends on government regulation. As managers, including price management departments, economic operations management departments, and state-owned enterprise assessment departments, while allowing thermal power companies to generate electricity without taking into account losses, they issued a major contract to implement double-regulation coal prices, while focusing on assessment based on profit indicators, which led to regulation. The direction did not form a consensus, and eventually formed a non-market unplanned embarrassing situation.
The contradiction between coal and electricity is a manifestation of deep-seated contradictions. The huge losses of thermal power companies and the huge profits of coal companies are determined by the current situation of China's resource allocation system. Most of the backbone thermal power enterprises in the province are mainly affiliated with the five major power generation companies and other central enterprises. Coal companies, except for a few central enterprises such as Shenhua and China Coal, are all basically local enterprises. Coal and chemical fertilizer thinning are the result of the game of deep interests of the central government.
This has a history of evolution. Before liberation, China already had small coal mining and small hydropower construction. Therefore, after the liberation, it basically continued the allocation of resources for local Shangguan small coal mines and small hydropower. In 1998, the state dissolved the coal department and subordinated to the state-owned key coal enterprises (except Shenhua). In addition to six large companies such as group companies, all local management is devolved, so coal is basically a local management.
Now that oil, natural gas, large hydropower, nuclear energy, etc., which are in absolute proportion in China’s energy industry, were all put into place by the central government after the liberation of manpower and material resources, this part of the allocation of natural resources naturally belongs to the central government.
Although the provinces currently have the financial strength to develop these projects, they do not have the corresponding resource allocation rights and income rights. The provinces have made quite a few remarks on the central government’s take away of local oil, gas, and large hydropower, leaving only a small amount of tax revenue for local governments. Some provinces have even issued compensation measures for the collection of compensation for natural resource development. They were later stopped by the state. In fact, it reflects that local governments are dissatisfied with the country's control over the allocation of resources and the right to receive revenues in local areas.
The coal-electricity contradiction in our country has been a long time ago, but why hasn't the government made relevant policy adjustments?
(a) The relevant government departments have historically re-emphasized the fairness of primary energy sources and energy sources, light secondary energy sources and various energy sources. Their attention is mainly focused on whether China’s overall energy supply can meet the needs of national economic development. In the current situation where petrochemical energy needs to be imported in large quantities, the contradiction between coal and electricity is a secondary contradiction in China's energy development.
(b) Although the State has set up an energy board to deal specifically with the country’s energy work, the energy management functions are actually scattered among the more than a dozen ministries (bureaus) such as the relevant departments of the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Construction. Horizontal coordination is difficult.
(3) The most difficult problem is that the contradiction between coal and electricity involves the contradiction between the central government and local governments. Only the higher level of the government can solve the problem.
The reform of resource income was divided into the reform of China's electric power system. Since the follow-up reform measures did not keep up, it became a pot of rice. The author believes that the real solution is to govern at the source, readjust the allocation and income rights of resources from the national level, and establish the awareness of all citizens in resource ownership.
The central government exercises the right of allocation and income on behalf of the people and entrusts the provincial government to manage them on a scale basis. It establishes a sound income sharing system and radically changes the original simple taxation system in place of the resource income distribution system. The resource-based enterprises will basically implement the approved cost plus reasonable profit method, and the resource-reducing revenue countries will take the bulk, and the local governments at all levels will share the proportion.
With the rapid development of China's economy and society, according to China's actual situation, we must, on the basis of ensuring energy supply, reflect fairness and reasonableness, appropriately allocate resources according to the requirements of marketization, and establish a coal power system mechanism that conforms to China's national conditions.
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